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Abstract 
This paper examines Norwegian gasoline pump prices using daily station-specific 
observations from March 2003 to March 2006. Whereas studies that have analyzed 
similar price cycles in other countries find support for the Edgeworth cycle theory 
(Maskin and Tirole, 1988), we demonstrate that Norwegian gasoline price cycles 
involve a form of coordinated behavior. We also show that gasoline prices follow a 
fixed weekly pattern, with prices increasing significantly every Monday at noon, and 
that gasoline companies appear to use the recommended price as a coordination 
device with a fixed link between the retail and recommended prices. Moreover, the 
weekly pattern changed in April 2004; whereas Thursday had been the high-price day, 
Monday now became the high-price day. The price–cost margin also increased 
significantly after the weekly pattern changed in April 2004. 
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‘Increases in local retail gasoline prices are set centrally in Oslo. When we receive 
the instruction on price increases on Mondays, we increase the price to the 
recommended price…It is very seldom that we receive instructions on price 
reductions, thus it is the local market that decides whether prices should fall.’ 
Manager of a Hydro-Texaco outlet in Norway1 
1. Introduction 
We use daily station-specific observations of gasoline pump prices from a large 
number of Norwegian stations from March 2003 to April 2005. Consumers reported 
prices to a website. In addition, we collected time series of daily prices at a smaller 
number of stations for two periods of 4–5 months during 2005 and 2006. In sum, and 
after analyzing in the order of 28,000 price observations, the short message to 
consumers in Norway is, “Don’t fill your tank on Monday afternoon.” 
Price cycles, where sharp price increases are followed by a gradual reduction of retail 
prices, are found in markets in the United States (Castanias and Johnson, 1993), 
Canada (Eckert, 2002, 2003, Eckert and West, 2004, and Noel, 2007a, 2007b) and 
Australia (Wang, 2005, 2006), among others. The majority of these studies find 
empirical support for the notion that these cycles are the outcome of aggressive 
competition à la Maskin and Tirole’s (1988) Edgeworth cycle theory. 
In contrast to other analyses of daily data, we find that the cycle period is exactly one 
week. Since April 2004, prices have, almost without exception, increased sharply at 
noon on Mondays. Prices then gradually decline over the week (with a few 
exceptions), and are at their lowest level on the weekend and Monday morning. The 
day of the week then triggers the sharp increase in prices, rather than the lower 
boundary of prices. After Easter 2004, we find a remarkable change in price 
fluctuations. Before April 2004, we also observed weekly cycles, but from March 
20032 to April 2004, almost all stations had their highest weekly price at noon on 
Thursdays. Moreover, before April 2004, Monday was the low-price day. Hence, 
Monday changed from being the low-price day to the high-price day almost 
‘overnight’. We do not have quantity data, but because of the shift in the focal day for 
                                                 
1 Ole Tofsrud, Trønderbladet (newspaper), December 7, 2004. 
2 Of course, the pattern could have been present earlier, but our data only begins in March 2003. 
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price increases in 2004 and other general information about the demand pattern, the 
hypothesis that there is a day-of-the-week demand cycle appears implausible. As in 
previous analyses of daily retail gasoline prices (Eckert and West, 2004, and Noel, 
2007a), we rule out fluctuations in the wholesale price as a cause of the price cycles 
observed. 
Maskin and Tirole (1988) show that these asymmetric cycles, labeled Edgeworth 
cycles owing to Edgeworth (1925), may arise from intense competition where firms 
have an incentive to undercut each other in order to achieve an immediate and large 
increase in market share. They then successively undercut each other in a price war 
phase, until further undercutting becomes too costly. We then have a war of attrition 
phase until one firm assumes the burden and raises prices. Other firms will then 
immediately follow suit and increase their prices, but not to the same level as the firm 
that initiated the price increase. The next cycle will then begin.3 
The price reductions we observe in the Norwegian daily retail pump prices from 
Monday afternoon to the following Monday morning are consistent with the 
undercutting phase in the Edgeworth cycle model. Retail outlets decide their retail 
prices, and have an incentive to undercut each other. However, scrutiny shows that the 
fixed pattern of repeated weekly price increases on Mondays is hardly consistent with 
some of the key assumptions in Edgeworth cycle theory. As mentioned earlier, it is 
the day of the week rather than the level of prices that initiates new cycles, and the 
focal day for price increases has shifted from Thursday to Monday. 
Finally, while we observe local competition among retail outlets that set retail prices 
independently during the week, we find a striking fixed link between retail pump 
prices and the recommended price after prices have increased on Mondays. The 
headquarters of each brand of gasoline decide the recommended prices. 4  What 
                                                 
3 Eckert (2003) and Noel (2007b, 2006) show that Edgeworth cycles in equilibrium are not restricted to 
a symmetric duopoly with homogenous goods, as assumed by Maskin and Tirole (1988). Eckert (2003) 
and Noel (2007b) allow for different firm sizes, and show that smaller firms (independent brands) have 
greater incentive to undercut equal prices than larger firms (major brands). Noel (2006) shows 
Edgeworth cycle theory is robust with respect to some degree of product differentiation and different 
assumptions about aggregate demand elasticities. 
4 In the Norwegian market, the big four companies have a combination of fully owned retail outlets and 
franchisees. Franchise managers as well as fully owned outlets appear to have substantial autonomy 
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apparently happens is that local Edgeworth cycle competition takes place, but stops 
every Monday with a coordinated price increase. When combined with the shift in the 
high-price day in 2004, this suggests there is more to Norwegian price cycles than 
aggressive competition. We thus observe that companies appear to harmonize 
Monday as the high-price day. Furthermore, we find indications that the change in 
price patterns was profitable, with the gross margin of gasoline stations increasing 
after the change in the weekly pattern in April 2004 by as much as 14–23% on 
average on weekdays. 
This begs the question as to why a coordinated restart on Mondays is profitable. We 
do not have a unique explanation, though intertemporal price discrimination may be 
one potential one. Informally, Eckert and West (2004) suggest that the price patterns 
observed in a period with a high price succeeded by a period with a lower price may 
be used to price discriminate between shoppers and loyal consumers, as shown by 
Conlisk et al. (1984) and Sobel (1984), among others. These models assume durable 
goods in the sense that consumers have the ability to either wait or possess inventory 
capacity. Dutta et al. (2007) generalize the standard repeated game model and allow 
for consumers who are long lived and forward looking. They thereby combine 
elements from the Coase-conjecture literature and the literature on repeated games. 
Dutta et al. find that under certain circumstances, there are equilibria with temporary 
price cuts where firms make higher profits than under uniform collusive pricing. We 
may consider these equilibriums as intertemporal price discrimination. 
Noel (2007a) suggests that one of the reasons why it is improbable that collusion can 
explain price cycles elsewhere is the complexity involved in price patterns.5 What we 
observe in the Norwegian market is a coordination of price increases only on Monday 
afternoons. This is clearly a simpler form of price coordination that encompasses both 
strong local competition and centrally coordinated prices. By using this simple 
coordination rule, the headquarters may put into practice a price structure that largely 
                                                                                                                                            
with respect to their decisions on retail prices and following local rivals. In 2006, 37% of retail outlets 
were franchises (source: Norwegian Petroleum Industry Association). 
5  ‘[S]etting up and policing a complicated system of differentially and fast-moving prices among 
hundreds of stations would be very difficult and require plenty of explicit communication.’ Noel 
(2007a, p. 17) 
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resembles what they would have done to undertake intertemporal price discrimination. 
During the first part of the week, prices will be high, while in the latter part of the 
week and during weekends prices will be low. 
We establish that different stations have an individual pricing rule that they strictly 
follow according to the recommended price. Communication about prices, which 
provides commitment value and more information to consumers about retail price 
differences, may well be welfare enhancing. However, in the case at hand, it is 
difficult to see these efficiency effects from the ‘public’ announcement of 
recommended prices. There is no benefit to consumers, and recommended prices are 
made public primarily to increase transparency among competitors and facilitate 
potential horizontal coordination. Even if the company headquarters are not allowed 
to post recommended prices on public websites, they may still give information about 
recommended prices to their own outlets. However, a ban on the public 
announcement of recommended prices may make it significantly more difficult/costly 
to coordinate a focal day and level for price increases across companies. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents details of related empirical 
studies and the observed price cycle pattern in Norway. In Section 3, we descriptively 
and econometrically establish the cycle pattern, and dismiss demand and cost shifters 
as potential explanations for the pattern observed. In Section 4, we show how 
recommended prices are employed as a coordination device to decide the price level 
every Monday and present an empirical analysis of developments in the gross margin. 
Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
2. Norwegian price cycles and a comparison with previous studies 
2.1. Price cycles in the Norwegian retail gasoline market 
We collected two data sets with daily station-specific observations of gasoline pump 
prices. The first is from a national website-based (NWB) panel data set. This is from a 
large number of nationwide Norwegian stations over the period March 2003 to April 
2005, where consumers (via text messages or emails) reported prices. The original 
data set comprised approximately 40,000 observations. We reduced the sample to 
26,823 observations by excluding gas stations with less than 100 observations. In 
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addition, we collected a time series (LTS) of daily prices from local stations for two 
periods of 4–5 months over 2005 and 2006. This yielded 1,067 observations from 
seven stations, with daily prices varying between 50 and 312 days.6 
The NWB and LTS data sets are complementary in the sense that, whereas the web-
based data allows us to examine a wider set of stations over a longer time period, the 
local data on specific gasoline stations allows for a more precise analysis of price 
patterns. In the LTS data we have consecutive observations for relatively long periods 
that we can compare with recommended prices. The data sets are described in more 
detail in Appendix A. 
Figure 1 Weekly price and cost patterns based on the local time series of average 
daily prices over seven stations collected between January 4, 2005 and March 15, 
2006 (n = 1,067 (price), n = 1,062 (Rotterdam + tax), illustrated for four weeks) 
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The average daily prices over all seven local gasoline stations are illustrated in Figure 
1. Clearly, the price is at its highest on Monday before gradually returning to its 
lowest level over the week. The difference between Monday and Sunday is NOK0.52, 
compared to the weekly average price of NOK10.49 (about 5%). The pattern has clear 
                                                 
6 In the LTS data, six stations are located in Bergen (Norway’s second largest city) and one station is in 
Oslo. 
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similarities to an Edgeworth cycle pattern, except that the cycle appears to repeat 
itself over a fixed seven-day pattern.7 
Table 1 Daily price changes across seven gasoline stations for the period January 4, 
2005 to March 15, 2006 (n = 1,056) 
 Observations Price increases Price reductions No Price change 
  n mean N mean n 
 
Monday 149 117 0.677 5 –0.108 27 
  (78.5%)  (3.4%)  (18.1%) 
Tuesday 153 8 0.575 80 –0.266 65 
  (5.2%)  (52.3%)  (42.5%) 
Wednesday 152 7 0.579 86 –0.314 59 
  (4.6%)  (56.6%)  (38.8%) 
Thursday 149 31 0.436 65 –0.274 53 
  (20.8%)  (43.6%)  (35.6%) 
Friday 149 14 0.594 79 –0.285 56 
  (9.4%)  (53.0%)  (37.6%) 
Saturday 152 5 0.224 52 –0.264 95 
  (3.3%)  (34.2%)  (62.5%) 
Sunday 152 2 0.690 22 –0.163 128 
  (1.3%)  (14.5%)  (84.2%) 
       
Total 1056 184  389  483 
  (17.4%)  (36.8%)  (45.7%) 
Figure 1 presents the average price changes. The price changes for all stations and 
weeks for the LTS data are summarized in Table 1. There are potentially 149 
observed prices where the Monday price can change, and as many as 117 (79%) price 
increases, with the average price increase being quite high, with an average of 
NOK0.68. If we consider the remaining days when prices could change (907 days), 
we only observe 67 days where prices increase (7%). Turning to days with price 
reductions, we find that on only five occasions are price reductions observed on 
Mondays, but there are as many as 384 price reductions on other weekdays, 
amounting to 42% of the 907 potential days. On the remaining weekdays, we observe 
no price changes.8 The price decreases are also lower in magnitude than the price 
increases, ranging from NOK0.16–0.31 on average between Tuesday and Sunday. 
                                                 
7 The pattern is for prices collected between January 4, 2005 and March 15, 2006, with prices collected 
every afternoon. 
8 Decreases predominantly take place from Tuesday to Friday, accounting for 44–57% of potential 
cases. On weekends, some action also takes place, but once again these are overwhelmingly price 
decreases. 
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This suggests a clear pattern, with prices showing increases on Mondays and then 
gradually decreasing over the remaining weekdays. 
We now turn to the NWB data, where we find an identical pattern. To make the 
picture clearer, we construct alternative days in the sense that each day starts at noon, 
e.g., Monday starts at noon on Monday and lasts until noon on Tuesday and is 
denoted ‘AltDay1’. However, in this dataset the price pattern changes after Easter 
2004 from being highest on Thursdays to highest on Mondays. 
Figure 2 Weekly price pattern based on web-based panel data where days are defined 
from noon to noon, showing the series of daily prices, and averages per day per year 
(n = 26,823, illustrated for four weeks) 
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Figure 2 illustrates this for the period before and after April 2004. After Easter, we 
observe the same pattern as in the LTS data, whereas before Easter 2004, Thursdays 
were the high-price day.9 Finally, it is worth noting that the biggest change in the 
pattern before and after April 2004 is that Monday changes from being the low-price 
day to the high-price day. We clearly have a pattern shift, but from Figure 2 it is not 
                                                 
9 Yet another interesting feature is that the amplitude of the weekly cycle increases significantly. Prior 
to April 2004, the difference between the highest and lowest price day was NOK0.33, whereas after 
April the difference is as high as NOK0.44, an increase of 32%. This is in line with what we observed 
in the more recent LTS data, where the amplitude was NOK0.52. 
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obvious that this happens on a certain date. To better observe this, we calculated price 
differences between Monday and Thursday for the NWB data over the period March 
2003 to April 2005, and present these in Figure 3. The figure shows a clear pattern 
whereby the Thursday price is predominantly higher than the Monday price before 
Easter 2004 but after Easter, the price is higher on Mondays. We see this very same 
pattern in our more recent time series data.10 Figure 3 also suggests a return to the 
previous Thursday pattern over six weeks during the fall of 2004 (Monday, 7 
September–Sunday, 25 October). This may relate to an increased awareness in the 
Norwegian print media of both the newly adapted Monday pattern and a significant 
increase in the wholesale price of gasoline.11 
In sum, we can see a pattern of a fixed weekly price cycle whereby after April 2004 
prices increase sharply every Monday and then fall during the week. We also have a 
clear indication in April 2004 of a shift in this weekly pattern. Hence, even though the 
Norwegian price pattern has similarities with findings elsewhere, some important 
distinctions remain to be understood.12 
                                                 
10  To better understand this pattern shift, we systematically went through the major Norwegian 
newspapers from 2004. Interestingly enough, the wholesale price of gasoline increased significantly 
towards the end of March 2004 and retail prices reached the ‘symbolic’ upper price limit of NOK10 per 
liter for the first time. For instance, in Dagbladet, a major newspaper: “We are approaching NOK 10 
per litre with express speed; the increasing international gasoline prices affect retail prices also in 
Norway.” (Dagbladet, March 23). Other articles on gasoline pricing also appeared during this period, 
e.g. in VG, February 26, Nordlys, March 8 and Nordlys, March 9. 
11 In the fall, attention to the weekly price pattern again increased in the major newspapers. In late July, 
Aftenposten recommended to their readers “not to fill their tanks on Monday afternoons.” (July 28, 
2004), and one day prior to the return to the old pattern, Stavanger Aftenblad pointed out that 
“Gasoline is most expensive on Mondays.” At the same time, the wholesale price continued to increase, 
and we found several entries on this in the major newspapers during the same period (VG, September 
10, NTB, October 13, Adresseavisen, October 14, Aftenposten, October 13, Stavanger Aftenblad, 
October 14). By the end of 2004, however, retail gasoline prices above NOK10 had become ‘everyday 
prices’, and the attention given to gasoline prices in Norwegian newspapers returned to ‘normal’. 
12 In Figure 2, we also see that the price cycles prior to April 2004 had fewer similarities with the 
predictions of Edgeworth cycle theory. Prices change gradually both before and after the higher priced 
day (Thursday) and prices are at their lowest level on Mondays. We wish to show that the pattern after 
April 2004 is partly the outcome of a coordinated process, as against the price cycles prior to April 
2004. We do employ, however, the observation that there was an abrupt change in the price pattern in 
2004 to dismiss alternative explanations for the observed pattern after April 2004. 
  
9
Figure 3 Price differences between Monday and Thursday (Thursday price minus 
Monday price) for the period March 2003 to April 2005 based on the web-based panel 
data where days are defined as noon to noon, (n = 26,823, area marked is April 2004) 
 
2.2. Comparison with previous studies of retail price cycles 
The studies closest in spirit to the current paper are Eckert and West (2004) and Noel 
(2007a), both of whom find support for the Edgeworth cycle explanation. Eckert and 
West (2004) use data on daily retail gasoline prices for the period July–December 
1999 for 8 regions in the Vancouver metropolitan area. Analogous to our NWB data, 
they use data reported by consumers to a website (some 16,671 unique reports). Noel 
(2007a) uses daily pump prices from 22 stations over 131 days in Toronto in 2001; 
this corresponds to our LTS data. While consistent with Edgeworth cycle theory, Noel 
(2007a) finds evidence inconsistent with several alternative explanations, including 
day-of-the-week demand cycles, menu and inventory costs, rack price discounts, and 
collusion. 
The main distinction between our observations and those of Eckert and West (2004) 
and Noel (2007a) relates to the process when prices increase sharply. We show that 
the Norwegian price cycles are exactly one week, and identify a change in the weekly 
pattern from Thursday to Monday as the high-price day. As shown below, we also 
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find evidence of a coordinated process whereby prices on Mondays jump to a level 
displaying a fixed relationship to the recommended prices set by the majors’ 
headquarters. A recent study by Wang (2006) shows how phone activity by the 
market leader resets Edgeworth cycles in the Australian retail gasoline cartel. 
Some other studies have also considered weekly retail gasoline prices. Eckert (2003) 
and Noel (2007b) analyze weekly prices in the Canadian retail gasoline market, and 
find cycles consistent with Edgeworth cycle theory. Importantly, the type of 
fluctuations we focus on in the present analysis cannot be discovered using weekly 
data.13 
3. Empirical analyses of Norwegian price cycles 
There are several candidates for explaining the weekly pattern observed. In particular, 
we consider potential demand and input price patterns and the predictions of 
Edgeworth cycle theory. 
3.1. Demand as a potential explanation for the Norwegian price cycles 
The most important feature in the dismissal of a demand pattern explanation is the 
shift in the weekly pattern. As illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, we show how the price 
pattern changed significantly after April 2004, with a change in the high-price day 
from Thursday to Monday. Furthermore, the price pattern on Monday changed the 
most, from being the low-price day prior to April 2004 to the high-price day after 
April 2004. It is very unlikely that the weekly demand pattern changed as abruptly as 
the price pattern after Easter 2004. In general, it is also unlikely that we have a large 
increase in demand on one day followed by six days with small reductions in 
demand.14 
                                                 
13 Castanias and Johnson (1993) provide statistics for Los Angeles from 1968 to 1972 that appear as 
Edgeworth cycles. Moreover, several studies analyze different forms of asymmetric pricing, i.e., a 
faster reaction in retail prices to upward changes than to downward changes in wholesale prices 
(Bacon, 1991, Borenstein et al., 1997, Asplund et al., (2000), Bachmeier and Griffin, 2003, Eckert, 
2002, Bettendorf et al., 2003 and Bettendorf et al., 2005). Slade (1987, 1992) analyzes separate price 
wars in the Vancouver area during the summer of 1983, finding that shifts in demand trigger price 
wars. 
14 See also discussion in Noel (2007a). 
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Notwithstanding the lack of quantity data, we still have two sources of information on 
weekly demand patterns. First, we searched Norwegian newspapers and found 
indications for that: (i) demand is lowest on weekends, and (ii) demand is either 
constant or increases slightly from Monday to Friday.15 Second, if we assume that the 
response frequency of prices in our NWB data set relates to how often people fill up 
with gasoline, we find a somewhat similar pattern (see Table A3 in the Appendix). 
3.2. Input price variation as a potential explanation for the Norwegian price cycles 
Another obvious factor that can explain a weekly price pattern is weekly variation in 
wholesale prices. The two most important cost components are the wholesale price for 
gasoline, usually measured using the Rotterdam spot price, plus taxes (environment 
and value-added taxes). Table A4 in the Appendix summarizes the decomposition of 
the retail price for the LTS data.16 In Figure 1, we showed the average weekly pattern 
in retail price and taxes plus the Rotterdam spot price. It is difficult to observe a 
weekly pattern in the cost components. The LTS data suggests a weekly average of 
NOK7.28 with a weekly deviation smaller than NOK0.01. Thus, a potential weekly 
cost pattern (if any) can barely explain a price pattern with a deviation of NOK0.52 in 
the retail price. 
In sum, this means that the pattern we observe in retail prices more or less directly 
translates into the gross margin of gas stations. This is illustrated for the LTS data in 
Figure 4. Whereas the deviation over the week only represents 5% of the retail price, 
the deviation in the margin amounts to 37% of the mean gross margin. Finally, 
analogous to Noel (2007a), we dismiss the explanation that gasoline inventories at the 
                                                 
15 According to, e.g., Per Vangen, their stations have their highest sales on Fridays, and their lowest 
during the weekend, with a gradual increase during the week (source: Dinside, March 12, 2002). 
16 As much as 66% are taxes, whereas the wholesale price only amounts to 23% of the retail price. 
Eleven percent remains as gross margin for the gasoline station to cover wages, rent, etc. Except for 
value-added tax (VAT) shifting according to the retail price, tax is fixed, and wages and rent are clearly 
unlikely to change over the week. Hence, the only candidate remaining to explain weekly variation is 
the Rotterdam spot price. 
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retail stations influence retail prices. There is no clear weekly pattern, with a 
representative gasoline station filling their tanks 2–3 times per week.17 
Figure 4 Weekly price and margin pattern based on the local time series of average 
daily prices over seven stations collected between January 4, 2005 and March 15, 
2006 (n = 1067 (price), n = 1,062 (Rotterdam + tax), illustrated for four weeks) 
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3.3. Edgeworth cycle theory as a potential explanation for Norwegian price cycles 
The gradual price reductions from Monday afternoon to the following Monday 
morning are consistent with the predictions of Edgeworth cycle theory. On the other 
hand, we cannot rule out alternative explanations like intertemporal price 
discrimination and/or tacit collusion (see below).  
There are strong indications that prices are driven downwards through local 
competition between Mondays, whereby each retail outlet decides its own retail price 
independently. In contrast, the sharp jump in prices on Mondays appears to be 
                                                 
17 We questioned gas station managers and were told that the wholesaler, who can read local station 
consumption with an automatic meter, controlled the filling of their tanks, and after optimizing on 
logistics (trucks), continuously filled the station tanks. This took place 2–3 times per week, and 
involved the delivery of 43,000 liters (a full truck) on each occasion. 
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inconsistent with the relenting phase in Edgeworth cycle theory. As shown above, it is 
the day of the week rather than a lower boundary of retail prices that triggers the sharp 
increase in prices. Combined with the observation that the price cycles changed 
abruptly after Easter 2004, one potential hypothesis is that local Edgeworth cycle 
competition takes place, but stops every Monday through a coordinated price increase. 
In Section 4 below, we scrutinize the coordinated process, and consider why the 
headquarters may want to coordinate price jumps on Mondays. 
Noel (2007a) suggests that fluctuations in weekly demand may have an impact on 
when firms relent in the Edgeworth cycle model. If we observe that firms are more 
likely to relent on a given day (period) with low demand, where the loss from being 
the initiator of a new cycle is lower than when demand is higher, this may be regarded 
as supporting Edgeworth cycle theory (Noel, 2007a). However, demand does not 
appear to be particularly low on Mondays (or Thursdays). Moreover, we do not 
observe price increases during the weekends, when demand is low.18 
3.4. Econometric analysis 
So far, we have discussed price cycles in a purely descriptive fashion. In this section, 
we introduce some simple econometric models which we use to statistically test the 
descriptive findings. We begin by analyzing the NWB data set. Since we have an 
unbalanced panel with a large number of gasoline stations, we make some 
simplifications. First, to account for potential regional differences, we regionalize the 
data set into ten regions, permitting the inclusion of dummy variables. Second, we 
cannot impose an autoregressive process, since we have a significant number of 
consecutive observations for only a few stations. Consequently, we estimate the 
following model: 
(1) 
tib bibrir
REGION
rd tdd
tTrendtRotterdamtTAXti
BrandREGIONAltDay
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18 At first sight, the observation that prices stay constant at their lowest level for some days may be 
consistent with the war of attrition phase in Edgeworth cycle theory. However, we would expect that at 
least some firms would increase their prices on, e.g., Sundays rather than Mondays, when the loss from 
being the first to raise prices is lower than on Mondays. Nevertheless, while we would expect this to 
happen every now and then, this is not the case. 
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In the regional panel model, we have 10 region dummies (REGION)19 and 7 brand 
dummies (Brand).20 Tax enters through a continuous variable as total tax in NOK 
(TAX), and we also allow for a linear trend (Trend). Furthermore, we control for 
changes in the wholesale price of gasoline (Rotterdam). The weekly retail price cycle 
is controlled for using 6 dummies (AltDay) for days (noon to noon), with Monday as 
the reference day. We estimate the model for the period ‘prior to Easter 2004’ 
(07:03:2003–26:04:2004), and for the period ‘after Easter 2004’ (27:04:2004–
08:04:2005). 
The results are presented in Table 2. We first estimated both models in (1) with a 
trend, but since this turned out to be significant only for the period prior to April 
2004, we omitted the trend for the second half of the data set. Both tax and the 
wholesale variables are significant and positive for both periods. The results suggest a 
weak negative trend prior to Easter 2004. The brand dummies are significant in 12 of 
14 cases. The four majors all have positive parameters ranging from 0.074 to 0.128, 
whereas the lower-priced automat stations, as expected, have negative parameters 
(between –0.173 and –0.102). This suggests that there is an average price differential 
between majors and automat stations of NOK0.17–0.30. In addition, the regional 
dummies are significant (in 9 of 10 instances), indicating the presence of regional 
price differences and that prices are at their highest in rural areas.21 The explanatory 
power is reasonably high, even though we were unable to incorporate an 
autoregressive process into the model. 
                                                 
19 The 10 regions are (number of observations in parentheses): Oslo West (3,242), Oslo South (2,408), 
Oslo North (4,884), Akershus North (2,853), Vestfold/Buskerud (3,622), Østfold (2,825), Trondheim 
(2,444), Bergen (849), Sogn og Fjordane & Møre og Romsdal (754), Rural areas (2,410). 
20 We included 8 brands (number of observations in parentheses): 4 majors; Esso (8,382), Hydro- 
Texaco (3,167), Shell (3,791) and Statoil (6,831), and 4 automat companies; JET (1,973), UnoX (830), 
SMART (1,584) and REMA (265). We assign dummies to the first seven. 
21 There could be potential local market effects that are unaccounted for by the regional dummies. 
When we estimated the models including dummy variables for the 116 stations in our sample, the 
results did not change. 
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Table 2 Empirical results for gasoline price models using web-based panel data (n = 
26,823) 
 Prior to 04:2004 After 04:2004 
Tax 1.831 *** (0.172) 0.818 *** (0.079) 
Rotterdam 1.428 *** (0.026) 0.873 *** (0.019) 
AltDay2 0.182 *** (0.012) –0.055 *** (0.014) 
AltDay3 0.239 *** (0.012) –0.201 *** (0.014) 
AltDay4 0.342 *** (0.012) –0.151 *** (0.014) 
AltDay5 0.129 *** (0.016) –0.281 *** (0.018) 
AltDay6 0.020  (0.022) –0.351 *** (0.023) 
AltDay7 0.047 *** (0.012) –0.430 *** (0.014) 
Esso 0.112 *** (0.035) 0.132 *** (0.047) 
Hydro-Texaco 0.128 *** (0.036) 0.151 *** (0.048) 
JET –0.102 *** (0.036) –0.052  (0.049) 
Shell 0.074 ** (0.036) 0.098 ** (0.048) 
Smart –0.103 *** (0.037) –0.029  (0.051) 
Statoil 0.089 *** (0.035) 0.197 *** (0.047) 
UnoX –0.173 *** (0.040) –0.146 *** (0.054) 
Oslo West –0.532 *** (0.027) –0.224 *** (0.045) 
Oslo South –0.862 *** (0.018) –0.212 *** (0.017) 
Oslo North –0.654 *** (0.017) –0.062 *** (0.021) 
Akershus North –0.798 *** (0.016) –0.229 *** (0.017) 
Vestfold/Buskerud –0.601 *** (0.017) –0.169 *** (0.019) 
Østfold –0.639 *** (0.017) –0.292 *** (0.018) 
Trondheim –0.745 *** (0.018) –0.382 *** (0.019) 
Bergen –1.031 *** (0.017) –0.639 *** (0.019) 
Sogn/Møre –0.490 *** (0.025) –0.238 *** (0.026) 
Rural areas –0.135 *** (0.024) –0.021  (0.031) 
Trend –0.001 *** (0.00005)    
Constant –1.313 * (0.777) 4.253 *** (0.387) 
       
N 14 746   12 077   
R2 0.456   0.313   
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level 
Turning to the weekly cycles, we find results that are in accordance with the average 
prices reported earlier. Prior to April 2004 AltDay4, Thursday, is the high-price day. 
Thursday is even significantly higher then AltDay3, Wednesday, with the second 
highest price.22 When looking at the weekly pattern after April 2004, the reference 
day (Monday) is the high-price day, with all AltDay dummies being significant and 
                                                 
22 An F-test clearly rejects the null hypothesis of 34
0 : φφ =H  with a statistic of 72.67. 
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negative, and generally increasing in magnitude (negative) until Sunday. The 
predicted difference between Sunday and Monday is as much as NOK0.43.23 
The more recent LTS data is modeled and estimated in Appendix B. This shows a 
clear pattern of Monday as the high-price day, mirroring the results found for the 
NWB dataset after April 2004. The next step is to investigate further whether the price 
jump that now takes place every Monday afternoon is the result of a coordinated 
process. 
4. Gasoline prices jump on Mondays: An outcome of a coordinated process? 
4.1. How to coordinate Monday as the high-price day 
The majors all have what they refer to as recommended retail prices. The 
recommended prices were previously posted for all companies on the same publicly 
available website.24 This information is no longer available on the same website due 
to requirements set by competition authorities, but companies are still permitted to 
post the same information on the gasoline companies’ individual websites with open 
access to consumers, as well as rivals. We collected some of these prices for the LTS 
data period. In Figure 5, we show the development of actual retail and recommended 
prices for one of our Statoil stations. On every Monday, the recommended and the 
retail price coincide. Thus, every Monday the station increases their price to the same 
level—the level suggested by the recommended price. The retail price mostly then 
gradually reduces during the week, and typically will be significantly below the 
recommended price towards the end of the week. 
This pattern is hardly a coincidence. However, to analyze this in a more systematic 
manner, we looked at price differences for all Mondays where recommended prices 
are available, and compared these to the actual retail price in the LTS data.25 
                                                 
23 The dataset comprises both majors and low-priced automat stations. One could believe that the latter 
followed a different price pattern than the majors, however this is not the case. For instance, for the 
period after April 2004, the price patterns of the majors and automat stations over the week had a 
correlation of 0.93, whereby the change from Monday to Sunday is NOK0.434 for the majors and 
NOK0.40 for the automat stations. 
24 The Norwegian Petroleum Industry Association’s website. 
25 We only have recommended prices for Statoil. 
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Figure 5 Daily gasoline prices, Statoil gasoline station, NHH, Bergen, January 2005 
to May 2005, (n = 120) 
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There are 71 Mondays where we can compare prices, as shown in Figure 6. The 
pattern is quite striking, with a fixed link between the retail and recommended price 
on Mondays. Only in nine of the 71 weeks does the pattern deviate. Another thing that 
is clear from Figure 6 is that different stations have individual pricing rules. For 
instance, on 35 of 36 Mondays the NHH station (the outlet also presented in Figure 5) 
increases its price to NOK0.02 above the recommended price. Correspondingly, the 
Nesttun and Askøy stations set their price to NOK0.04 and NOK0.05 above the 
recommended price. Nadderud sets their price to exactly the recommended price. The 
prices very probably differ by transportation costs.26. In sum, this appears to suggest 
that the different gasoline outlets have different pricing rules, but are all related in a 
fixed proportion to the recommended price.27 
                                                 
26 NHH is closest to the central depot (+0.02), Nesttun is somewhat further away (+0.04) and Askøy is 
the most remote station (+0.05). The companies have very detailed grids for the country where they 
distinguish between transport costs and differences in competition (Nadderud is an Oslo station and we 
have no other local stations with which to compare it). 
27 Interestingly enough, Nesttun has the most deviations relative to their pricing rule. This is what we 
also found in the econometric time series model, with the Statoil station at Nesttun facing the highest 
local competition in our sample. What happens here is that even though we collect prices in the 
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Figure 6 Price differences between retail and recommended prices on Mondays at 
four Statoil gasoline stations for the period January 4, 2005 to March 15, 2006 (n = 
71) 
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Hence, not only are the companies able to synchronize the day they increase prices, 
they are also able to coordinate the price level towards which the price should be set. 
While we have only looked at Statoil stations where comparisons have been made 
between recommended and retail prices, the recommended prices displayed at other 
company websites also appear to be highly correlated.28 
In sum, the recommended price appears to serve two purposes for the headquarters of 
the gasoline companies: (i) inform their retail outlets of the price level they should 
follow on Mondays, and (ii) provide information to rivals that helps them monitor 
each other. Hence, there is one vertical and one horizontal element of the rule. 
In order to maintain the pricing rule, the headquarters of the big four companies 
induce their retail outlets to increase prices every Monday at noon in accordance with 
                                                                                                                                            
afternoon, the local competition has already started ‘working’ and prices have already started to 
decrease when we observe the retail price, i.e., the weekly cycle has begun. 
28 The companies only post today’s recommended price. Therefore, we cannot find recommended 
prices for other companies retrospectively. 
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their individual rules. The recommended price may then be considered as a vertical 
price restraint. Since the rule de facto instructs a given retail price at noon on 
Mondays, the restraint may be regarded as Resale Price Maintenance (RPM). In the 
case at hand, it is important to note that about one-third of the big four’s retail outlets 
operate as franchises (in 2006).29 If the recommended price de facto is RPM, this may 
be in conflict with the competition law relating to retail outlets that operate as 
franchises. However, we also find strong indications that headquarters, in addition to 
posting the recommended price on their websites, use fax, email and text messages as 
ancillary restraints to induce their outlets to keep to the Monday rule. The local 
manager of a Hydro-Texaco outlet told a newspaper, ‘Increases in local retail 
gasoline prices are set centrally in Oslo. When we receive the instruction on price 
increases on Mondays, we increase the price to the recommended price. The 
recommended price does not need to be the same everywhere.’30 Since, the retail 
outlets have significant autonomy with respect to retail price reductions throughout 
the week, headquarters needs to instruct their fully owned retail outlets as well as 
franchises to increase the price on Mondays in order to uphold the pricing rule. 
However, if the only purpose of the recommended price were to inform fully owned 
as well as franchised outlets of the price level they should use on Mondays, there 
would be no reason to make the recommended price publicly available to rivals, since 
the same information could be made available through alternative internal information 
sources, such as intranets. Hence, public information about the recommended price 
seems to indicate that the recommended price is used to facilitate horizontal 
coordination between companies. Without the publicly available recommended prices, 
the companies would have to make direct contact, and thus engage in collusion that is 
more explicit.31 
                                                 
29 Source: Norwegian Petroleum Industry Association. 
30 Ole Tofsrud to the newspaper Trønderbladet, December 7, 2004. 
31 The recommended prices for the different companies are easily found, as they are all made publicly 
available on their web pages: see, for example, Statoil, 
(http://www.statoil.no/FrontServlet?s=sdh&state=sdh_dynamic&viewid=drivstoff_priser), Shell 
(http://www.shell.com/home/content/no-no/shell_for_businesses/priser/veiledende_priser.html) and 
Hydro (http://www.yx.no/hthjemmeside/internet.nsf/default.htm?OpenPage). 
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When the recommended price is publicly available for rivals, it becomes easy for the 
various headquarters to monitor each other, and the publicly available recommended 
price facilitates the detection of deviations from the rule on increasing the retail prices 
every Monday to a level given by the recommended price.32 The recommended price 
as a vertical price restraint that facilitates horizontal coordination also makes the 
current story topical to one of the most hotly debated issues in competition policy. 
This is that vertical price restrictions are usually treated less favorably than nonprice 
restrictions, and RPM has generally been banned per se.33 
This distinction between price and nonprice restraints contrasts with economic theory 
on vertical restraint, which shows that both types of restraint may improve or reduce 
economic efficiency. Moreover, they are often viewed as alternative instruments to 
achieve the same outcome (for overviews, see Overstreet, 1983, and Mathewson and 
Winter, 1998). Within competition policy, it has often been argued that price 
restraints, and in particular RPM, could facilitate horizontal agreements. This 
argument was informally used by Telser (1960), but has only recently been formalized 
by Jullien and Rey (2007), who show that RPM may facilitate the detection of 
deviations. In the case at hand, the role of recommended prices appears to make it 
easier for firms to detect whether rivals defect from coordination on Mondays as the 
high-price day. 
4.2. Why coordinate on Monday as the high-price day? 
We do not put forward any unique explanation for the observed coordination on 
Monday as the high-price day, but propose that intertemporal price discrimination 
may be one explanation. Intertemporal price discrimination has also been suggested as 
an alternative explanation for price patterns that appear as Edgeworth cycles (see 
                                                 
32 For the same reason, this may explain why headquarters want fully owned outlets, as well as 
franchises, to have significant freedom in reducing retail pricing throughout the week. Allowing each 
outlet to reduce their retail price will most likely assist collusion, since it allows for more timely 
punishment compared with a case where retail prices are centrally decided. 
33 The definition of what constitutes RPM has subsequently narrowed in both the US and in Europe. 
The most dramatic change occurred in June 2007 when the US Supreme Court overruled the nearly 
one-hundred-year-old per se ban on RPM (Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, 2007). Like 
other vertical restraints, resale price maintenance in the US is now judged by the rule of reason. 
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discussion by Eckert and West, 2004). A potential hypothesis that brings together 
seemingly competing explanations of the observed price patterns is the following. 
Assume that at the outset we have local competition between retail outlets in 
accordance with Edgeworth cycle theory. As shown above, we observe strong 
indications of a coordinated restart of price cycles every Monday. By creating this 
restart every Monday, we have a period with relatively high prices at the beginning of 
the week. Local competition à la Edgeworth cycle theory will, however, reduce prices 
throughout the week. Consequently, a simple coordination rule that restarts price 
cycles on Mondays may be sufficient to implement a price structure that largely 
introduces intertemporal price discrimination between consumers that differ in their 
willingness/ability to wait. 
Conlisk et al. (1984) consider a monopoly provider of durable goods that uses 
periodic reductions in price to discriminate between low- and high-value consumers. 
Consumers are then assumed to differ in their reservation price, as well as in their 
willingness to wait. Low-value consumers will be more willing to wait for price 
reductions than high-value consumers. We may analogously interpret the willingness 
to wait as the cost of inventorying. In terms of gasoline, the cost of inventorying may 
relate to how much people drive. The Norwegian price pattern clearly suggests a fixed 
seven-day cycle. People who use less than a tank of gasoline per week may therefore 
wait until the price falls, though people with a higher usage cannot. 
Sobel (1984) extends Conlisk et al. (1984) to the case of competition. As in Conlisk et 
al. (1984), the high-value consumers have a higher reservation price and are less 
willing to wait than low-value consumers. Moreover, high-value consumers have 
higher searching costs, and they buy from a given preferred retailer as long as the 
price is below the reservation price. Put differently, the high-value consumers are 
locked in. The low-value consumers are shoppers that buy from the retailer with the 
lowest price. Retailers then charge a high price in the initial phase of the cycle. When 
the aggregate number of shoppers becomes sufficiently large, it becomes profitable to 
reduce the price and serve the shoppers. 
These models assume durable goods in the sense that either consumers have the 
ability to wait or they have inventory capacity. This is mostly inconsistent with 
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gasoline retailing due to the length of the observed cycles (see Hosken et al., 2007). 
However, when the cycles are exactly a week, a large fraction of the consumers have 
the opportunity to shift consumption from one day of the week to another.34 
In Conlisk et al. (1984) and Sobel (1984), new consumers enter the market in each 
period, but consumers who do not buy remain in the market, and the residual demand 
builds up until price cuts become profitable. Dutta et al. (2007) combine elements 
from repeated game and durable goods models where the residual demand is bounded 
by the ‘death’ of consumers. However, residual demand may be large enough to 
ensure temporary price cuts in equilibrium. Roughly speaking, Dutta et al. (2007) 
shows that the existence of an equilibrium with temporary price cuts depends on the 
fact that firms are more patient than consumers. The result is qualitatively in line with 
Sobel (1984), and may be viewed as a form of intertemporal price discrimination.35 
The choice of Monday as the focal day for price increases is also consistent with 
intertemporal price discrimination. When prices increase on Mondays, retail prices are 
at their lowest level during the weekends, when less price sensitive business 
customers are not present in the market.36,37 
As a complement to our analysis of the price data, we undertook opinion surveys 
among customers while they were filling their vehicles with gasoline. 38  It is 
remarkable that after such a long period of transparent and predictable weekly cycles 
                                                 
34 The average yearly driving distance of privately owned cars in Norway differs according to the 
different surveys undertaken, but is generally estimated to be in the range of 12,000 to 15,000 km per 
year. This suggests an average of 250–300 km per week, requiring most consumers to fill their tank 
only once a week. See http://www.prosus.uio.no/publikasjoner/Rapporter/2004-3/kapittel_5.pdf. 
35 Note that consumers expect the price increase in next period, and temporary price cuts in equilibrium 
are thus different from equilibrium price wars. 
36 Another reason to use Monday as the high-price day is that there may be a peak load problem. The 
demand is higher during the weekdays compared with the weekends. If we assume the stations have 
scarce capacity (e.g., the number of pumps), the price pattern may also be a peak load pricing device. 
However, this peak load problem will vary across different stations, while the observed weekly cycle is 
found throughout Norway. Thus, we do not believe that the main motivation behind the coordination 
process is the peak load problem. 
37 A large fraction of utility drivers use diesel cars. Thus, one may argue that these do not matter for 
gasoline pricing anyway. However, according to simple average statistics provided by DinSide, diesel 
prices show a similar weekly pattern. 
38  The survey was conducted using two of our local gasoline stations, Tertnes and NHH, and 
undertaken on both Monday and Thursday afternoons of four different weeks in the period April/June 
2005 and March/April 2006. In total, we received responses from 474 gasoline customers. 
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as observed in Norway, close to two-thirds of consumers were not aware of any 
weekly pattern of gasoline prices. The surveys were administered between one and 
two years after the pattern with price increases on Mondays was established in the 
market. This suggests that at least a large fraction of consumers is less price sensitive 
than is often assumed in retail gasoline markets. Furthermore, the pattern is subtle 
enough that less price sensitive consumers might not observe it and adapt to a low-
price days filling pattern.  
So far, we have focused on consumers being heterogeneous in their willingness to 
wait. Salop (1977) shows that a monopolist may practice price discrimination between 
informed and uninformed consumers by offering a distribution of prices.39 The survey 
findings indicate that consumers also differ according to their information about 
prices and price patterns. Only 41% of customers check the price sign when entering 
the station, and only 38% have some notion of a weekly price pattern. Of the latter 
group, 43% thought that Monday was the high-price day.40  
In order to be a plausible strategy, the coordination process on price jumps on 
Mondays should be profitable for the major companies. Given the lack of quantity 
data, we will look at developments in the gross margin before and after the change in 
pattern in 2004. Before we specify an econometric model, we focus somewhat more 
closely on what happened in 2004. In Table 3, we present summary statistics on some 
of the key variables. 
The average gross margin across all 26,823 observations is NOK0.85. If we examine 
the simple average prior to April 2004, it is marginally lower (0.83) and afterwards is 
marginally higher (0.89). Since the gross margin covers costs, this increase of 7.7% 
may be due to cost increases (wages, rent, etc.) and it is therefore difficult to conclude 
                                                 
39 Several papers extended Salop’s model to a competitive environment, but in these extensions price 
discrimination occurs across firms rather than at the firm level. A competitive version where each firm 
provides multiple prices has not been explored (Stole, 2007). 
40 As expected, customers who check the price sign are also better informed as to the weekly price 
pattern. From those checking prices with a notion of a weekly price pattern, 49% believed the high-
price day was Monday, whereas within the group of customers who did not check the price sign, fewer 
had a notion of a weekly price pattern. Of these, only 35% thought that the high-price day was 
Monday. 
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anything from these figures. Thus, we also present summary statistics for the one 
hundred days before and after the shift. 
Table 3 Summary statistics: gross margin, tax, wholesale price and retail gasoline 
price from web-based panel data (n = 26,823) 
| Number of station price 
observations 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max. 
Whole sample 26823 0.854 0.423 –1.634 3.554 
Before Easter 2004* 14746 0.825 0.429 –1.356 3.456 
After Easter 2004** 12077 0.889 0.413 –1.634 3.554 
      
The 100 days before 
Easter 2004 
     
Retail price 3897 9.145 0.554 7.550 10.220 
Wholesale price 3897 1.795 0.132 1.587 2.129 
Tax 3897 4.720 0.000 4.720 4.720 
Vat 3897 1.829 0.111 1.510 2.044 
Gross margin 3897 0.801 0.422 –0.525 1.608 
      
The 100 days after 
Easter 2004 
     
Retail price 2920 9.732 0.501 7.210 13.230 
Wholesale price 2920 2.156 0.162 1.861 2.441 
Tax 2920 4.720 0.000 4.720 4.720 
Vat 2920 1.946 0.100 1.442 2.646 
Gross margin 2920 0.909 0.410 –0.968 3.554 
* Before Easter 2004 is the period 07:03:2003–27:04:2004. 
** After Easter 2004 is the period 28:04:2004–08:04:2005. 
Over a period of six months within the same year, it is difficult to discern whether the 
cost components covered by the gross margin should change significantly. The retail 
price increases from NOK9.14 to 9.73 between these two periods (6.4%). However, 
whereas the tax does not change during these two hundred days, the wholesale price 
does, increasing from NOK1.80 to NOK2.16. If we account for the VAT, this 
amounts to most of the price increase. However, when we look at the gross margin it 
has still increased between these two periods by as much as NOK0.11, or 13.5%, on 
average. Thus, it appears that some of the price increase is used to obtain higher 
margins. 
However, considering averages does not allow us to control for changes in costs and 
the weekly price pattern. Thus, we use the web-based panel data set (NWB) to specify 
a simple econometric gross margin model. This model has the same form as the price 
model in (1) except that we will use the full data set and introduce a shift dummy that 
accommodates the change in the price pattern. 
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The shift dummy ( SHIFTtD ) takes a value of 0 for the period ‘prior to Easter 2004’ 
(07:03:2003–26:04:2004), and 1 for the period ‘after Easter 2004’ (27:04:2004–
08:04:2005). Including the interactions with the daily dummies permits the weekly 
pattern to change before and after Easter. The shift dummy also measures whether the 
margin changed after April 2004.  
The results are presented in Table 4, and are much in line with what we found in the 
price models in Table 2. The weekly pattern does change from Thursday to Monday 
as the high-price day,41 and whereas the wholesale price has a negative impact on the 
gross margin, tax has an opposite effect. The latter can be a trend correlation effect, 
since we find the trend to be slightly (but significantly) negative (the correlation 
between Trend and Tax is as high as 0.86).42 The majors have a higher margin than 
the automat stations of between NOK0.11–0.24 (13–28%). However, they also have 
higher costs. The regional dummies are all significant, and stations in rural areas have 
the highest margins, though they also bear the highest transport costs on their gasoline 
supplies.43 
                                                 
41 The week dummies are actually insignificant prior to April 2004, whereas they are highly significant 
after April 2004. If we exclude the trend variable, they also become significant prior to April 2004. 
Note also that to find the weekly price pattern after April 2004, we have to calculate the sum of shiftdφ  
and dφ for the respective days. These follow a clear pattern, with Monday as the high-price day 
followed by gradually decreasing prices. The respective figures are Monday (–0.11), Tuesday (–0.16), 
Wednesday (–0.28), Thursday (–0.24), Friday (–0.36), Saturday (–0.40) and Sunday (–0.45). 
42 If we exclude the trend variable, the tax variable as with the wholesale price becomes negative (and 
significant). 
43 In addition, we estimated a model with station-specific dummies. The results are in line with the 
results using the regional dummies. 
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Table 4 Empirical results for gross margin model, web-based panel data (n = 26,823) 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
SHIFT
tD  0.198*** (0.025) 
AltDay 1 –0.441 (0.325) 
AltDay2 –0.294 (0.325) 
AltDay3 –0.244 (0.325) 
AltDay4 –0.166 (0.325) 
AltDay5 –0.302 (0.326) 
AltDay6 –0.402 (0.326) 
AltDay7 –0.409 (0.325) 
AltDay1 SHIFTtD⋅  0.326*** (0.026) 
AltDay2 SHIFTtD⋅  0.139*** (0.026) 
AltDay3 SHIFTtD⋅  –0.031 (0.026) 
AltDay4 SHIFTtD⋅  –0.073*** (0.026) 
AltDay5 SHIFTtD⋅  –0.057** (0.029) 
AltDay6 SHIFTtD⋅    
AltDay7 SHIFTtD⋅  –0.044* (0.026) 
Trend –0.0004*** (0.00003) 
Tax 0.383*** (0.071) 
Rotterdam –0.176*** (0.011) 
Esso 0.103*** (0.023) 
Hydro-Texaco 0.120*** (0.024) 
JET –0.058*** (0.024) 
Shell 0.072*** (0.024) 
Smart –0.041* (0.025) 
Statoil 0.117*** (0.023) 
UnoX –0.119*** (0.026) 
Oslo West –0.292*** (0.019) 
Oslo South –0.398*** (0.010) 
Oslo North –0.307*** (0.011) 
Akershus North –0.418*** (0.009) 
Vestfold/Buskerud –0.312*** (0.010) 
Østfold –0.370*** (0.010) 
Trondheim –0.451*** (0.011) 
Bergen –0.659*** (0.011) 
Sogn/Møre –0.292*** (0.015) 
Rural areas –0.033** (0.015) 
R2 0.262  
N 26823  
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level 
When we look at the shift dummy, it comes in significantly positive, concluding a 
substantial increase of NOK0.20 in the weighted average margin when controlling for 
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week pattern, costs and trend. Directly translated, this means that the average gross 
margin went up as much as 23% after April 2004.44 
Our survey data clearly show that at least a significant fraction of consumers spends 
some time learning the new pattern.45 Before all of these customers adapt to the new 
pattern, the companies increase their sales on higher priced days, thereby increasing 
their average margin. However, since we do not have sales figures, we cannot 
calculate the increase in margin, though it would add to the figures we present here. 
Thus, our estimated margin increase will very likely underestimate the full margin 
effect for companies from the change in the weekly price pattern. 
5. Summary and conclusions 
We use daily station-specific observations of gasoline pump prices from a large 
number of Norwegian stations from March 2003 to March 2006. Whereas studies that 
have analyzed price cycles in other countries have concluded aggressive competition 
as the driving force, we show that some form of coordinated behavior is present in the 
Norwegian market. The coordinated restart of price cycles every Monday seems to 
increase the margins of gasoline companies. 
We establish that there is a weekly pattern in Norwegian gasoline prices, with some 
similarities to so-called Edgeworth cycles. However, the Norwegian pattern 
distinguishes itself from what has been found elsewhere in several respects. First, the 
cycle is fixed, in the sense that it lasts exactly one week. Second, there has been a 
change from Thursday to Monday as the high-price day during our observation 
window of approximately four years. Because of these characteristics, it is natural to 
question whether the price jumps that now take place every Monday are the result of a 
coordinated process, rather than the result of fierce competition. 
We find a rather striking pattern, whereby there is a fixed link between the retail price 
and the recommended price after the prices jump on Mondays. Further, we establish 
                                                 
44 If we exclude the trend, the estimated shift parameter is lower (0.12), but still suggests an increase of 
14% in the average gross margin. 
45 In the 2005 surveys, 13% of consumers thought that Monday was the high-price day. By 2006, this 
figure had increased to 23%. 
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that the different stations have an individual pricing rule that they strictly follow. 
Communication about prices, which provides commitment value and more 
information to consumers about retail price differences, may very well be welfare 
enhancing (see for example Motta, 2004, and Kühn, 2001). In the current context, 
however, it is difficult to see the efficiency effects of the ‘public’ announcement of 
recommended prices. There is no benefit to consumers, and recommended prices 
appear to be made public primarily to increase transparency among competitors and 
facilitate potential horizontal coordination. 
As argued by Motta (2004) and Kühn (2001), communication directed only to rivals 
should be banned. This suggests that it is important to make such communication as 
difficult as possible. However, even if the various company headquarters are not 
permitted to post recommended prices on public websites, they may still give 
information about recommended prices to their own outlets (or alternatively send 
faxes, text messages and emails46). However, this may make it significantly more 
difficult/costly to coordinate a focal day and a focal level for price increases across 
companies. Noel (2007a) suggests that one of the reasons why it is improbable that 
Edgeworth cycles can be explained by collusion is the complexity involved in price 
patterns. What we observe in the Norwegian market is, instead, the coordination of 
price increases on Monday afternoons. This is clearly a simpler form of price 
coordination that encompasses both strong local competition and centrally 
coordinated prices. 
Importantly, we do not question empirical support for the Edgeworth cycle rationale 
found in several other markets. Our message is, rather, that while we observe price 
fluctuations that look very much like Edgeworth cycles in Norway, closer 
examination indicates alternative rationales. Consequently, policy makers and others 
should be cautious when drawing the conclusion that observation of these cycles is an 
indication of a market with aggressive price competition. 
                                                 
46 This may also be illegal to franchised outlets not owned by the headquarters. 
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Appendix A – Data description 
The first data set is a website-based panel data set (NWB). This is compiled using a 
large number of nationwide Norwegian stations covering the period from March 7, 
2003 to April 4, 2005, where consumers reported prices via text messages or emails. 
The original data set had approximately 40,000 observations, but we reduced this to 
include only gas stations with at least 100 observations. The final sample comprised 
26,823 observations in total. We have information on price, station, address, date and 
exact time of the day. The NWB data is quite representative in terms of the main 
market brands. For instance, the four largest gasoline companies represent 83% of the 
observations; over the same period, their market share was close to 95%. The big four 
have the following market shares in the NWB data: Esso 31.3%, Hydro-Texaco 
11.8%, Shell 14.1% and Statoil 25.5%. Their corresponding average market shares for 
the period were 21.6%, 20.8%, 25.8% and 26.6%. Thus, we have a larger share of 
automat stations in our sample than their market share in the actual market, suggesting 
a downward bias in the average prices we observe. 
The other dataset consists of collected time series of daily prices at a smaller number 
of local stations (LTS) for two periods of 4–5 months during 2005 and 2006, with 
1,067 observations from 7 stations, varying between 50 and 312 daily prices. The 
prices were collected in the afternoon. The stations are as follows. 
Table A1 
Name Brand Data periods Address 
NHH Statoil 04.01.05–03.07.05, 
17.10.05–15.03.06 
Hellev. 34, 5042 Bergen 
Askøy Statoil 04.01.05–23.05.05 Ravnanger, 5310 Hauglandshella 
Nesttun Statoil 17.10.05–15.03.06 Nesttunv. 91, 5221 Nesttun 
Nadderud* Statoil 25.02.06–15.03.06 Nadderudveien 55, 1357 Bekkestua 
Nesttun Shell 17.10.05–15.03.06 Nesttunv. 87, 5221 Nesttun 
Askøy Hydro-Texaco 04.01.05–23.05.05 Davanger, 5310 Hauglandshella 
Tertnes Hydro-Texaco 04.01.05–23.05.05 Botnane 1, 5119 Ulset 
* Nadderud, a Statoil station in Oslo, is not local in the sense that it is not located in the Bergen area. 
In addition, we used recommended prices from Statoil collected from their web page. 
To calculate input prices, we used Rotterdam prices ‘Conventional Regular Gasoline, 
Rotterdam (ARA)’ and translated these into NOK using the daily exchange rate 
between USD and NOK. The environment tax on gasoline is constructed using figures 
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from The Norwegian Petroleum Industry Association. Summary statistics for the two 
datasets are tabulated below. 
Table A2 Summary statistics for retail and wholesale prices, tax and gross margins in 
the two data sets 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
2003 (NWB data)      
Price 10231 8.74 0.56 5.90 12.00 
Rotterdam 10231 1.51 0.14 1.25 1.89 
Tax 10231 4.64 0.00 4.64 4.64 
VAT 10231 1.75 0.11 1.18 2.40 
Gross Margin 10231 0.84 0.42 –1.36 3.46 
2004 (NWB data)      
Price 13693 9.45 0.61 6.63 13.23 
Rotterdam 13693 1.99 0.25 1.45 2.44 
Tax 13693 4.72 0.00 4.72 4.72 
VAT 13693 1.89 0.12 1.33 2.65 
Gross Margin 13693 0.85 0.42 –1.63 3.55 
2005 (NWB data)      
Price 2899 9.70 0.58 7.89 11.24 
Rotterdam 2899 2.00 0.21 1.55 2.60 
Tax 2899 4.85 0.01 4.81 4.85 
VAT 2899 1.94 0.12 1.58 2.25 
Gross Margin 2899 0.91 0.43 –0.49 1.82 
2005/2006 (LTS data)      
Price 1067 10.49 0.53 8.95 11.57 
Rotterdam 1062 2.43 0.29 1.86 2.99 
Tax 1067 4.84 0.03 4.81 4.89 
VAT 1067 2.10 0.11 1.79 2.31 
Gross Margin 1062 1.12 0.33 0.66 1.70 
Table A3 Response frequency in the NWB data set 
(March 2003 to April 2005, n = 26,823) 
 Frequency Percent 
Monday 5027 18.74 
Tuesday 4959 18.49 
Wednesday 4817 17.96 
Thursday 4892 18.24 
Friday 5000 18.64 
Saturday 1112 4.15 
Sunday 1016 3.79 
Total 26,823  
Table A4 Gasoline price decomposed into its main cost components (price, tax and 
Rotterdam prices) averages for the LTS data (n = 1,067) 
 Value % of Price 
Price 10.49 100% 
Tax 4.84 46.1% 
VAT 2.10 20.0% 
Rotterdam price 2.43 23.2% 
Gross Margin 1.12 10.7% 
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Appendix B – Econometric evidence for the local time series (LTS) data 
The local time series data allows us to specify a dynamic model that also accounts for 
serial correlation in the gasoline prices. However, we start by specifying a static 
model, and extend this with different autoregressive processes. In the dynamic 
models, the retail price today is modeled as a function of yesterday’s retail price and 
seven days ago (Pt–1 and Pt–7). Price is assumed to depend on tax. We model the tax 
effect through two dummy variables; the first (TAX05) takes a value of 1 for the 
period after April 1, 2005, and the second (TAX06), takes the value of 1 for all 2006 
observations.47 We also control for changes in the wholesale price (Rotterdam) and 
potential brand effects (Brand)48 through dummy variables, and include a separate 
dummy for our two stations at Nesttun (Nesttun) which are very closely located and 
compete more fiercely than any of our other 7 gasoline stations.49,50 The weekly 
gasoline cycle is controlled for using six daily dummies (Day) where Monday is the 
reference day. The models we estimate are various versions of: 
 
tj jijiNestuni ii
tRotterdamtTAXtTAXtititi
BrandNesttunDay
RotterdamTAXTAXPPP
εαδβφ
βββγγ
+++++
++++=
∑∑ ==
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2
1 ,
6
1
06057,71,1, 0605
 
The results are presented in Table 1B. In column (i), a static model is presented where 
both lagged price variables are omitted. While the static model fits the data reasonably 
well, it fails to survive the autocorrelation tests. In column (ii), we also include the 
lagged price, and we can see that the model both improves in explanatory power and 
has far less autocorrelation in the error term. However, the Box-Pierce test still 
                                                 
47 The environmental tax was changed twice during the sample period, on April 1, 2005 and on January 
1, 2006. 
48 We have three brands represented by Statoil (4 stations), Hydro-Texaco (2 stations) and Shell (1 
station). Statoil is specified as the reference category, so we only include dummies for Hydro-Texaco 
and Shell. 
49 The Nesttun stations consist of a Statoil station and a Shell station that are located on the same 
highway with a common exit, both with clearly visible price signs when drivers enter the exit. The 
location of the stations is also discussed in Appendix A. 
50 Box-Pierce tests of autocorrelation are performed for each individual station. Since we have two 
periods of data for one of our stations, we conduct separate Box-Pierce autocorrelation tests for each, 
giving eight Box-Pierce test results. 
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suggests some autocorrelation for station 1. Since we observe a weekly pattern in 
prices, we therefore extend the AR(1) model with 7, −tiP , as presented in column (iii). 
The autocorrelation reduces marginally, but we still have some autocorrelation 
remaining. Thus, the dynamic models in columns (ii) and (iii) are our preferred 
models. Their statistical properties are generally good, with an explanatory power of 
between 0.73–0.74 percent and autocorrelation rejected for 6–7 of the 8 stations. We 
also estimated the models by including a linear trend, but it was not significant. 
The Rotterdam price impacts significantly and suggests that the pass-through from 
changes in the wholesale price in the very short run is low, but closer to one in the 
long run (Rotterdamlr).51 The TAX dummies are positive, but are only significant for 
the 2005 dummy. This is not surprising, as only very small changes in tax level were 
imposed in the sample period, and therefore the variation in price due to tax changes 
is very low. The competition dummy (Nesttun) is negative for all three models, but 
significant only in models (i) and (iii), suggesting a retail price that is, on average, 
between NOK0.04 and NOK0.09 lower. The brand dummies are not significant in any 
of our models, suggesting only minor brand effects.52 
Turning to the dummies representing the potential price cycle, the same clear and 
significant weekly pattern in prices as shown in Figure 2 is confirmed using the 
econometric model. Prices are, on average, between NOK0.50 and 0.54 higher on 
Mondays compared with Sundays. Prices fall gradually over the week from Tuesday 
towards the weekend, and every Monday prices again increase abruptly. Thus, the 
weekly price pattern we established in section 3.4 for the NWB data also exists in our 
local time series data for 2005 and 2006. 
                                                 
51 If we test whether the long-run parameter is equal to one, we fail to reject the null hypothesis at 
approximately the 1% level. 
52 An alternative would have been to include separate station dummies and estimate a fixed effects 
model. However, this would not allow the inclusion of both brand dummies and the Nesttun dummy, 
since the three sets of dummies would be highly correlated. However, we also estimated the models 
with fixed effects station dummies and the results did not change. 
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Table B1 Empirical results for gasoline price models using local time series data 
 Static model 
(i) 
Dynamic model (ii) Dynamic model 
(iii) 
tax05 0.636*** 0.253*** 0.226*** 
 (0.042) (0.039) (0.044) 
tax06 0.042 0.00007 0.014 
 (0.031) (0.027) (0.027) 
Rotterdam  0.479*** 0.281*** 0.227*** 
 (0.077) (0.066) (0.067) 
Tuesday –0.111*** –0.404*** –0.378*** 
 (0.037) (0.034) (0.035) 
Wednesday –0.257*** –0.493*** –0.461*** 
 (0.037) (0.033) (0.034) 
Thursday –0.294*** –0.442*** –0.425*** 
 (0.038) (0.032) (0.033) 
Friday –0.422*** –0.533*** –0.494*** 
 (0.038) (0.032) (0.034) 
Saturday –0.505*** –0.567*** –0.532*** 
 (0.038) (0.032) (0.034) 
Sunday –0.526*** –0.536*** –0.503*** 
 (0.037) (0.031) (0.034) 
Nesttun –0.090*** –0.043 –0.059** 
 (0.032) (0.027) (0.027) 
Shell –0.019 –0.009 –0.008 
 (0.038) (0.032) (0.031) 
Hydro-Texaco 0.013 0.01 0.013 
 (0.026) (0.022) (0.022) 
Pricet–1 0.551***  0.510*** 
 (0.026)  (0.027) 
Pricet–7   0.086*** 
   (0.025) 
Constant 9.163*** 4.280*** 3.938*** 
 (0.162) (0.268) (0.354) 
R2 0.631 0.74 0.734 
n 1062 1052 996 
Rotterdamlr  0.625*** 0.561*** 
  (0.147) (0.168) 
Box-Pierce, station 1 13.594 8.037 7.354 
Box-Pierce, station 2 36.010 0.068*** 0.019*** 
Box-Pierce, station 3 18.239 0.778*** 0.002*** 
Box-Pierce, station 4 45.577 0.542*** 0.368*** 
Box-Pierce, station 5 78.884 5.348* 6.879 
Box-Pierce, station 6 51.486 2.638*** 4.664** 
Box-Pierce, station 7 56.376 0.123*** 0.011*** 
Box-Pierce, station 8 6.694* 1.002*** 1.097*** 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level 
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